Is there Democratic Deficit in the EU?

Is there Democratic deficit in the EU?It is showd by numerous commentators1 that there exists a classless famine inwardly the European centre although others argue2 that there exists no such popular famine, there are also those who acknowledge the existence of a democratic deficit exclusively that argue that it is not elusive3. This assignment result look at those arguments and contemplate whether or not in despite of numerous reforms the democratic au sotication of the EC still remain a concern. This argument will be realiseed in light of the evolving nature and the role of parliament.It is important first to realise what is meant by the democratic deficit. It is difficult to find a familiar definition however, in basic terms this argument suggests that the European fan tan as the tho directly elected body holds as well as little a role in the legislative plow. Supporters of the democratic deficit argument, argue that the European sevens, as the notwithstandi ng elected and democratic element of the European community, should exert more author over the legislative process and that the stream moorage means that the legislative process is controlled by the non-elected Council. It is argued that one of the study problems that this democratic deficit creates is a possibility that a sm each(prenominal) nonage in a state could be over-represented in the intergovernmental process and thence be able to impose its preferences even in the face of an fire European legal age4Conversely those that support the notion that the current situation does not create a democratic deficit point to the accompaniment that public interest in elections to the European sevens is low5 and as Bermann points extinct intimacy in elections for European sevens in June 2004 dropped to a record book low of 45.3 percent across the twenty-five extremity states. The argument is so that even though the MEPs are, in theory elected by the public, in reality they a re not supported by the majority and if they were provided with greater reason it would be of little relevance to persons at heart a member state. This supports the argument, which will be discussed later, that the solution is not to increase the violence of the European sevens but to increase the power of member states within the legislative process.In order to understand the evolution of the European Parliament it is important to consider briefly the legislative process and the growth of European Parliaments role in that process. Originally a curb number of Treaty Articles6 provided that the Council was required to consult the European Parliament as to its opinion before arriving at a decision on Community secondary law7. This position was confirmed by the case of Roquette Freres SA v Commission8, although the Council was permitted to ignore and overrule any opinion expressed by the European Parliament9.The Maastricht reforms amend Art 251. The new regime creates a co-decisi on surgical operation whereby the European Parliament finish reject a legislative proposal. Once the European Parliament has provided its views on a legislative proposal, the Council shall adopt a greens position by a measure up majority. The European Parliament can, within three months, either approve or take no decision in which case the Council can adopt the measure. Alternatively the European Parliament can reject or amend the proposal by an overbearing majority, if this situation occurs then the Council can approve those amendments by a qualified majority within a three month time limit. up to now if the Commission has issued a negative opinion on the amendments, the Council are nevertheless able to approve by unanimity. If the Council does then not agree this amended proposal it will be referred to a new Conciliation delegacy to in an effort to accomplish a compromise within 6 weeks. If a joint text is approved, the Council and European Parliament can then accept the provision together within six weeks and the European Parliament may finally reject it within six weeks by an unconditional majority. It is disputable that these reforms do not go far enough in addressing the democratic deficit and that they only provide a negative power of veto and in addition they will only apply to special(a) detail areas.Further flips were introduced by the Treaty of capital of The Netherlands, which whilst go someway to lessen the democratic deficit do not, it is argued, go far enough. The Treaty of Amsterdam increase the use of and streamlined the co-decision procedure. The Treaty also extended the areas in which the assent of the Parliament is to be required to incorporate the structural and coherence funds. However, it is pointed out that these do not actually increase the take of participation of the European Parliament and its capacity to insist on a specific measure and thus do little to reduce the democratic deficit and make the league more democ ratic10.Finally changes were implemented via the Nice Treaty, although these were truly limited in scope and did little to improve the democratic deficit. Although they it did extend the Qualified Majority Voting into new areas and also increased the effect of the co-decision procedure which was extended to include more treaty articles.The changes proposed in the ecesis for Europe11 are likely to set the foundation of the legislative procedures for galore(postnominal) years to come and in this regard they are very important. there are essentially three main changes that are proposed by the report which seek to improve the democratic deficit. The first of these is that there should be more involvement of the European Parliament in the adoption of all EU legislation and this is to be achieved by greater use of the Co-decision procedure, which it is intended, will be the normal procedure for enactment of legislation. The second change that is proposed by the Constitution is that t he member states parliament has a greater involvement. whizz of the main proposals is to enact a procedure whereby field parliaments can picture formal objections to a European Commission proposal because it failed to respect the principle of subsidiarity12. The final proposal is that Council meetings must be public or televised where legislative procedures are being discussed or voted upon, whether or not these proposals will revivify the democratic deficit remains to be seen. It is too early to finish whether or not this will solve the problem.There are deuce main suggestions for the improvement of country in Europe. The first argument, and the one which has been the checkmate of this assignment, is to increase the power of the European Parliament. The second suggestion involves increasing the power of national parliaments in the legislative process as the general public have little interest in who is elected into the European Parliament. Steiner and woods consider this s econd argument but conclude that at the take aim of individual pieces of legislation, national parliaments become involved in the process too late to have any real impact on the outcome, and the level of control exercised by the individual national parliaments may vary importantly between Member States13.Despite the increased power given to the European Parliament following the various treaties that have been discussed above, and as Weiler points out, the European Parliament is still characterised by a lesser degree of parliamentary commission and majority decision making in the European political process than its counterparts in national democracies14. However Dehousse15 argues that the argument that there is a democratic deficit is fundamentally flawed and that the EU encounters similar problems with democracy as are encountered in domestic constitutions and that some of the loudest complaints over a European democratic deficit may be based on idealisations of democracy in the nation-state. Those who do not support the concept of a democratic deficit argue that the preoccupation with the concept of democratic deficit is constraining and does little to improve our understanding of the role of the European Parliament16. Finally, Majone argues that the EU is a regulatory state-a state which despite its democratic deficit can be accountable17.Having considered the arguments it seems clear that perhaps one of the primary reasons for the smell that there exists a democratic deficit is that powers that were once controlled by national parliaments have now been transferred to the EU where they are subject to a glare degree of parliamentary participation18. Therefore it is argued that the democratic deficit does exist, but only in so far as it does not match political ideologies and does not mirror the political system of other member states. It is arguable that deficit does not in fact exist and that the EU system is simply different to member states politica l systems. Even if it could be reason that a democratic deficit did exist how to correct this deficit is problematic in itself. Some argue that a democratic model similar to that of the state should be developed whereas others argue that democracy can only be achieved through national democracies.19 One certainty is that it is an argument that will not be settled in the near future and it is indeterminate that the constitution will resolve the problem to the satisfaction of all member states.BibliographyCasesEP v Council (C-65/91)Parliament v Council (C-392/95)Roquette Freres SA v Commission (Case 20/88) 1989 ECR 1553TreatiesMaastricht Treaty 1997Nice TreatyTreaty of Amsterdam 1997journal ArticlesBarnard C, Dashwood A, (2006) The EU Constitution Dealing with the shortfall, 156 novel impartiality journal 173Bermann G, Monet J Gelhorn W, (2005) Executive Power in the New European Constitution, planetary ledger of constitutional police force 3.2 (440)Maduro M, (2005) The Impor tance of world Called a Constitution constituent(a) warrant and the Authority of Constitutionalism, transnational daybook of Constitutional righteousness 3.2 (332)Majone G, (1998) Europes Democratic Deficit The Question of Standards4 European Law Journal 5Weiler J, (2005) On the Power of the denomination Europes Constitutional Iconography, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173)BooksCraig P De Brca G, (2003)EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Third Edition, Oxford University crushFairhurst J , (2004) Law of the European Union, fifth part Edition, Pearson LongmanHarlow C, (2002) Accountability in The European Union, Oxford University matter, OxfordHartley T, (2003) The Foundations of European Community Law, Fifth Edition, Oxford University PressHorspool M Humphreys M, (2006) European Union Law, Oxford University PressLenaerts K Van Nuffel P,(2005)Constitutional Law of the European Union, import Edition, Sweet and MaxwellSteiner J Woods L, (2003) Textbook on EC Law, Eighth Edition, Oxford University PressWeatherill S, (2005) Cases and Materials on EU Law, ordinal Edition, Oxford University PressWeiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge University PressWebsiteshttp//european-convention.eu.int/ accessed on 21.10.20061Footnotes1 See for example the comments of Weiler J, (2005) On the Power of the Word Europes Constitutional Iconography, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173)2 See for example the comments of Dehousse R in Weiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge University Press3 See for example Majone G, (1998) Europes Democratic Deficit The Question of Standards4 European Law Journal 54 Weiler J, (2005) On the Power of the Word Europes Constitutional Iconography, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173)5 Bermann G, Monet J Gelhorn W, (2005) Executive Power in the New European Constitution, International Journal of const itutional Law 3.2 (440)6 177 old Arts 54 or 568 (Case 20/88) 1989 ECR 15539 Although consider EP v Council (C-65/91) and Parliament v Council (C-392/95) where the Court annulled Regulations which the Council had amended without barely interview to the European Parliament.10Lenaerts K Van Nuffel P,(2005)Constitutional Law of the European Union, Second Edition, Sweet and Maxwell at page11 http//european-convention.eu.int/ accessed on 21.10.200612 For further discussion see Barnard C, Dashwood A , (2006) The EU Constitution Dealing with the Deficit, 156 New Law Journal 17313 Steiner J Woods L, (2003) Textbook on EC Law, Eighth Edition, Oxford University Press at page 2514Weiler J, (2005) On the Power of the Word Europes Constitutional Iconography, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173)15Dehousse R in Weiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge University Press Chapter 6 Page cxxxv16 Harlow C, (2002) Accountability in The European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford See Chapter 1 by and large17 Majone G, (1998) Europes Democratic Deficit The Question of Standards4 European Law Journal 518 Maduro M, (2005) The Importance of Being Called a Constitution Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (332)19 Maduro M, (2005) The Importance of Being Called a Constitution Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (332)